Repositorio
Central Banks: From politically independent to market dependent institutions
Título
Central Banks: From politically independent to market dependent institutions
Código de publicación
- AD-00056
Autores/as
- Schwartz, P., & Castaneda, J.
Clave
- Artículo de investigación
Colaboradores/as
Claves o descriptores
Descripción
- Responses to the financial crisis are undermining the Chinese walls painfully built between monetary and fiscal authorities. Central banks and state treasuries are working side by side as lenders of last resort. Central banks are helping economic ministers with purchases of public debt and discounting of private paper. Regulation and control of financial institutions is now a political football. Central banks must be seen again as market-dependent institutions in a world of currency competition. Privatisation in law or in fact is back on the table.
Localización
Revista | libro
- Economic Affairs, 29(3), 9–16.
Idioma
- Inglés
Editor
- Institute of Economic Affairs
Año de publicación
- 2009
Formato
Identificador (ISBN/ISSN)
DOI o URI/URL
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.2009.01912.x
Derechos
- Restringidos
Fichero
- Disponible