Título

Compensation and agent heterogeneity

Código de publicación

• AD-00075

Autores/as

• Krause, M.

Clave

• Artículo de investigación

Colaboradores/as

Claves o descriptores

Descripción

• Personnel Economics has allowed us to better understand compensation schemes in face of the problems coming out of the principal-agent relationship, with individuals pursuing their own private interests making necessary a mechanism to promote the alignment of interests within the organization. The theory had to simplify its assumptions, particularly reducing the utility maximization principle to its monetary value. This paper considers the need to introduce the “heterogeneity” of agents for monetary and non-monetary incentives. There are problems with the limitation of knowledge and the possibility preferences may be revealed through some kind of exchange in which the principal offers a “menu of contracts”.

Localización

Revista | libro

• Espacios, 37(24), p. 2.

Idioma

• Inglés

Editor

Año de publicación

• 2016

Formato

Identificador (ISBN/ISSN)

DOI o URI/URL

• https://www.revistaespacios.com/a16v37n24/16372402.html

Derechos

• Abiertos

Fichero

• Disponible

URL permanente repositorio Universidad de las Hespérides

• http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14474/hesperides/repositorio/ad-00075

URL permanente fichero

URL permanente fichero repositorio Universidad de las Hespérides

• http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14474/hesperides/repositorio/file/ad-00075