Repositorio
The Stability Properties of Monetary Constitutions
Título
The Stability Properties of Monetary Constitutions
Código de publicación
- AD-00049
Autores/as
- Pablo Paniagua
Clave
- Artículo de investigación
Colaboradores/as
Claves o descriptores
Descripción
- The financial crisis brought about a higher degree of monetary policy unpredictability. To anchor expectations and promote nominal stability, there is a need for predictable monetary rules or stable constitutions. This paper’s purpose is to define the general expectational properties that monetary constitutions should possess to work as coordination devices. I use Buchanan’s predictability criterion, as well as the expectational monetary transmission mechanism, to propose that monetary constitutions should be considered stable as long as they contain dynamics allowing self-reinforcing expectations of monetary neutrality. Self-reinforcement of expectations is an integral property of monetary constitutions for them to be agents of coordination and therefore stable. I find that these expectational properties are consistent with the stability properties established in the constitutional literature.
Localización
Revista | libro
- Journal des Économistes et des Études Humaines, 22(2): 113–138.
Idioma
- Inglés
Editor
- De Gruyter
Año de publicación
- 2016
Formato
Identificador (ISBN/ISSN)
DOI o URI/URL
- https://doi.org/10.1515/jeeh-2015-0011
Derechos
- Abiertos
Fichero
- Disponible