Repositorio
The Robust Political Economy of Central Banking and Free-Banking
Título
The Robust Political Economy of Central Banking and Free-Banking
Código de publicación
- AD-00050
Autores/as
- Pablo Paniagua
Clave
- Artículo de investigación
Colaboradores/as
Claves o descriptores
Descripción
- This paper uses robust political economy to assess whether free banking or central banking can better use its institutional structures to minimize macroeconomic disequilibrium. Robust frameworks leverage their incentives, reward structures, and epistemic resources to achieve monetary policy objectives. We relax the assumptions of political pressure, self-interest, and the degree of decision makers’ knowledge to see which arrangements are more robust.
Localización
Revista | libro
- Review of Austrian Economics, 29(1): 15–32.
Idioma
- Inglés
Editor
- Springer Nature Link
Año de publicación
- 2016
Formato
Identificador (ISBN/ISSN)
DOI o URI/URL
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-015-0315-y
Derechos
- Abiertos
Fichero
- Disponible